The Dominion - war

Under the Radar

Tim McSorley — Mon, 28 Feb 2011 06:19:02 +0000

Diplomatic cables raise concerns of US influence in F-35 jet campaign

TORONTO—Classified cables released in December 2010 revealed an exhaustive American campaign to pressure Norway to buy a fleet of US-made F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jets. As the Canadian government looks to spend at least $16 billion on its own fleet of the controversial aircraft, it appears a similar campaign is underway here.

The American diplomat who filed the cables—cables which detail high-level diplomatic pressure on the Norwegian government and a media campaign to sway public opinion—is now based in Canada. Several of the tactics his cables recommend have recent parallels in this country, where the government is promoting the sole-sourced purchase as a done deal but has not signed an official contract.

Kevin Johnson, former Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Oslo, was named US Consul General to Toronto in August 2009—nine months after Norway announced it would buy a fleet of the Lockheed Martin-made stealth bombers. His name appears on several classified American cables released through Wikileaks last year.

Written over four months in late 2008, the cables advised the US state department to put pressure on Norway to ensure the sale while avoiding any appearance of doing so. A memo copied to the US embassy in Ottawa offered advice on how to replicate the campaign’s success in other countries.

In one leaked memo, titled “Lesson Learned From Norwegian Decision To Buy JSF,” United States embassy officials claimed the Norwegian government asked its American counterpart to publicly deny US officials had exerted pressure in the sale. The document also noted that the rival Saab Gripen bid offered superior benefits for Norwegian industries.

It stated Norway chose the F-35 despite the jet's high price tag—double that of the Gripen. Norway’s decision was a significant victory for the JSF program, and followed three months of lobbying subtly in public, forcefully behind closed doors.

In a cable sent September 22, 2008, the US Embassy in Oslo asked the US Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and several US embassies in Scandinavia to ensure Norway understood that diplomatic relations between the two countries would be affected by the choice.

“A Gripen decision would significantly alter the 40-year close relationship between our Air Forces and weaken one of the strongest pillars of our bilateral relationship,” stated the cable, titled “Norway Fighter Purchase: High-Level Advocacy Needed Now.”

The document’s author expressed concern that the F-35 was losing favour in the eyes of Norwegians.

“High-level Washington advocacy on this issue is needed to help reverse this trend,” the cable reads.

A public affairs officer from the American consulate in Toronto, Barbara Jafelice, declined to discuss the cables or Johnson’s relation to them, saying it was against policy to comment on anything Wikileaks-related. In an email, an unnamed public affairs officer from the consulate implied there was nothing abnormal about Johnson’s transfer, saying Foreign Service officers are typically moved to a new post approximately every three years.

The United States embassy in Ottawa declined The Dominion’s request for an interview.

The Oslo Cables

The dryly written cables from Oslo’s US embassy reveal much about how the US pressured Norway to buy the F-35.

One cable, sent October 30, 2008, lists then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, former State Department Assistant Secretary Mark Kimmitt and former United States Air Forces in Europe Commander Roger Brady as officials who pushed the sale. Their campaign produced a “coordinated...message which publicly professed the unequalled capabilities of the aircraft and the value we place on the relationship, and privately pressed for the selection of the F-35.”

The Norwegian government announced its decision to buy the planes November 20, 2008, nearly a month earlier than expected, although it has not yet signed a contract. The October memo noted the influence Norway's decision would have on the other participants in the JSF development program, countries including the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Turkey, Australia, Israel and Singapore.

“Norway will be the first JSF partner to make a choice on the plane and thus will disproportionally affect other partners' choices,” it read.

The “lessons learned” cable, sent December 16, 2008, encouraged other embassies campaigning on the JSF’s behalf to exert more than diplomatic pressure. It suggested off-the-record discussions with media outlets’ editorial boards, fielding supportive newspaper editorials written by military figures and hosting public speaking events tailored to shine a favourable light on the aircraft. The cable was copied to US embassies in several governments considering the jets, including Ottawa.

“Having a socialist government like Norway’s choose the JSF is an even more powerful symbol than if a right-wing government of another country had gone first,” it added.

If the tactics used in Norway seem familiar, it’s because many of them are being used in Canada, anti-war activist Tamara Lorincz told The Dominion. A member of the Halifax Peace Coalition and part of a group organizing a national March 3 rally against the jet purchase, Lorincz pointed to a string of government speaking engagements promoting the sole-sourced deal with Lockheed Martin.

“It’s almost unheard of, to have Minister of Public Works Rona Ambrose, [Industry Minister] Tony Clement and [Defence Minister] Peter McKay criss-crossing the country to try to build support for the F-35,” said Lorincz, a former NDP candidate in the Halifax West riding.

She attended an F-35 forum hosted by Dalhousie University’s Centre for Foreign Policy Studies on November 26, led by two members of the Department of National Defence (DND) procurement division and two members of the air force. The event was part of a string of similar engagements across the country promoting what will be the largest military purchase in Canadian history.

“They...essentially gave the talking points about why Canada should buy the F-35s to a receptive audience,” she said. “We know from Norway that we can’t trust what the Canadian government is saying.”

The Department of National Defence spent more than $130,000 on the tour, one media announcement and an industry trip to a Lockheed Martin facility in Texas, according to federal documents recently released by the Liberal Party of Canada. The documents, obtained by The Globe and Mail, also revealed that Industry Canada has spent $55,000 on foreign and domestic trips to promote the jet purchase.

The jets themselves are expected to cost at least $9 billion, with at least $7 billion in maintenance costs.

In late January, US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates visited Ottawa to publicly push for the planes at a press conference with Minister McKay.

“Obviously, having all of our partners continue to be with us in this program is very important and I'm pleased at the number of our allies who are going forward with the F-35,” said Gates. “Without getting into domestic affairs in Canada, I would just say that my hope is, that for all of our sakes, that all of our partners continue to move forward with us on this program.”

Meanwhile, the F-35 debate has been raging in Canada’s media. Stories by mainstream and alternative outlets have critiqued the sole-sourced contract, continued delays in the development process and the high cost to taxpayers, while government- and military-penned editorials have defended the planes.

On January 26, The Ottawa Citizen ran an op-ed titled “The truth about those jets,” written by retired General Paul Manson, a former Chief of the Defence Staff, and retired Lieutenant-General Angus Watt, a one-time air force commander. While attempting to debunk 10 common complaints about the F-35, its authors failed to note their connection to Lockheed Martin.

“Manson forgot to mention his post-military stint as the president of Lockheed Martin Canada,” military journalist Scott Taylor pointed out in Halifax’s The Chronicle Herald. “It should have been considered a salient point to make to readers.”

Taylor noted that Chief of the Air Staff Lieutenant-General Andre Deschamps has also come to the defence of the F-35 in the media, writing that it “is the right fighter aircraft for Canada” in the Canadian Military Journal.

Ministers McKay and Ambrose have also waded into the fray, fielding a response to “Ottawa off course on jets,” a letter co-written by Lorincz and Steven Staples of the Rideau Institute think-tank, published in The Chronicle Herald in December 2010.

“This...piece presents a misleading and inaccurate account of our government's decision to procure F-35 fighter jets,” wrote McKay and Ambrose in a letter to the editor, decrying Staples and Lorincz’s claim that the planes were sole-sourced. “There was an international competition held between 1997 and 2001—of which Canada was a part—and the winner of this competition was the F-35. Another lengthy competition is redundant and unnecessary.”

Not so, says Alan Williams, former Assistant Deputy Minister (Material) for the Department of National Defence. Williams led Canada’s military procurement division from 1999 to 2005 and says government claims that a competition was held are disingenuous.

“This competition had absolutely nothing to do with the need...to determine which jet aircraft in the marketplace can meet the Canadian military requirements at the lowest life-cycle costs,” Williams told the House of Commons’ Standing Committee on National Defence in October, explaining the competition the ministers refer to was conducted by the US in 2001 to determine which company would build the jet.

“Equating one competition with the other insults our intelligence,” he said.

According to figures Williams presented to the committee, sole-sourcing at DND has gone from 8.8 per cent of all contracts worth more than $25,000 in 2004, the year before he retired, to 42 per cent in 2009. When making deals worth billions, that increase represents a significant amount of taxpayer money, said Williams, the author of Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement, subtitled “How to fix Canada’s dysfunctional defence procurement process.”

“The military loses [this money] from two perspectives...If you squander it, that’s money that would be open and available for other projects,” he said in an interview with The Dominion. “Equally—more importantly—if your objective is designed to buy what’s best for the military, the only way you truly know that is by running a competition.”

According to information posted on a DND website, Canada needs new fighters by 2016 in order to be ready for the retirement of the country’s F-18 fleet at the end of this decade. However, recent reports have revealed the Lockheed Martin stealth bomber won’t be out of its development phase until late 2016, making it unlikely that Canada’s order for 65 planes will be ready that year.

Williams believes that leaves the government enough time to clearly and publicly define its requirements and launch a bidding process.

“There’s nothing from stopping us tomorrow from launching a competition...The F-35 might turn out to be right, but at this stage it’s years behind schedule and its costs have gone crazy. We don’t know today what it will cost us to buy, maintain and whether it will ever be operational. But if the JSF turns out to be the right one, we can still go ahead and get it.”

When questioned about the plane’s selection, DND communications advisor Evan Koronewski directed The Dominion to the ministry’s website, which boasts of the fighter’s advanced “fifth generation” capabilities and the potential for interoperability with other NATO forces.

He was unable to answer questions on the sole-sourced contract or speak to Williams’ assertion that the plane was chosen before the military had defined its requirements. Although promising to seek that information, he did not meet several agreed-upon deadlines and at press time had not provided the information.

In October, the Rideau Institute’s Staples penned a report on the jet purchase called “Pilot Error: Why the F-35 stealth fighter is wrong for Canada.” Released by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, it encouraged legislators to examine the role a Canadian military plane would play, suggesting a single-engine stealth bomber wasn’t appropriate for missions such as patrolling the Arctic.

“We don’t need the bombing role,” he told The Dominion. “The F-35 is basically a big bomb truck. That’s why it’s stealth. The single engine is a problem as well. One could fail when you’re a long way from home.”

Lorincz would prefer the money went to altogether different projects, such as health care, education and the environment.

“[The government is] not acting in the best interests of Canadians,” she said. “They are working in concert with one of the largest weapons manufacturers on the planet to get the Canadian government to agree to buy something we absolutely don’t need.”

Saira Peesker is a Toronto-based journalist who covers politics, social justice issues and the arts.

F-35 fighter jet

The Ethnography of an Air-Strike

Tim McSorley — Mon, 12 Apr 2010 05:54:49 +0000

Canada’s military academics in the Afghan war and at home

MONTREAL—In the age of counterinsurgency and the battle for “hearts and minds,” cultural knowledge is valuable currency for the military intelligence business. The desire for cultural intelligence in Afghanistan and Iraq has led Canada and the United States to implement hybrid military-academic programs meant to mimic anthropological research, mapping the “human terrain” of a battlefield.

These programs have led to serious concerns among social scientists in general, and anthropologists in particular, about the possible militarization of their practice, and the erosion of the creditability of their work.

According to Robert Albro of the American Anthropological Association (AAA), there is a fear among academics that the military wants to “plug into” anthropological knowledge without engaging in a dialogue that respects the work, ethics and history of the discipline. Anthropologists in Canada and the United States worry that their discipline could go the way of physics after the creation of the atomic bomb in World War II, weaponizing knowledge at a cost to anthropology as well as the cultures and people it studies.

In late 2008 the Canadian Forces launched a new counterinsurgency initiative in Afghanistan. Entitled the White Situational Awareness Team (WSAT) program—named for military colour codes of red for enemy, blue for friendly and white for civilian. It is similar to the controversial Human Terrain Teams (HTT) deployed by the United States military in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2007. HTTs are the on-the-ground research arm of the United States’ Human Terrain System (HTS) which, according to military sources, is “designed to meet the military’s requirements for socio-cultural knowledge across a spectrum of operations that the US may encounter in today’s world.” Each HTT is made up of five members, three military personnel and two civilians, while each WSAT includes two military intelligence officers and three civilian Department of Foreign Affairs employees.

Critiques of HTS range from calls for its immediate and complete halt, to recognizing an inherent value while denouncing program management. Plagued by scandal, HTS has been caught in a firestorm of internal and external discontent. According to a former employee who spoke confidentially to The Dominion, HTS, in its current form, cannot function as a war-fighting system, and those who should be concerned with its ineffectiveness are more concerned with selling the perception that it works.

Anthropologists in the United States have pushed back. The AAA, founded in 1902 and the largest professional association of anthropologists in North America, published a public statement on HTS in October 2007 calling HTS an “unacceptable application of anthropological expertise.”

The Network of Concerned Anthropologists (NCA) was founded by eleven academics in 2007 to resist the militarization of anthropology. In 2009, the NCA published The Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual: Or, Notes on Demilitarizing American Society in response to the publication of US Army US Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, a document the NCA calls “faking scholarship.” They directly counter the military’s declaration of success, writing, “[T]here is no evidence, as some supporters have claimed, that the program saves lives.”

In fact, even as these programs are developed, casualty rates have continued to increase year over year. According to a report from the Integrated Regional Information Networks, a project of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 6,584 civilians were killed in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2009. In the first ten months of 2009, they estimated that over 2,000 civilians had been added to that total.

“We modelled our approach upon that taken by physicists critical of Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative,” said Roberto Gonzalez, founding member of the NCA. “After much discussion, we decided to take collective action and produce a statement of our objections to developing trends in the militarization of anthropology.”

The statement has since garnered 1,000 signatures from anthropologists and other like-minded scholars, including a number of Canadian anthropologists, declaring non-participation in all counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Although not opposed to “all work with military and civilian policy makers,” the NCA is “staunchly opposed to HTS.”

One of these Canadian signatories is Dr. Maximilian Forte, Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology & Anthropology at Concordia University in Montreal, and member of the steering committee for Anthropologists for Justice and Peace.

“I am totally opposed to the use of anthropologists and other social scientists in any situation where combat, counterinsurgency, or even the psychological and cultural manipulation of other societies is concerned,” said Forte. “If academics align themselves with the national security state, they diminish the relevance and credibility of their work, and potentially endanger the reputations and lives of all other academics.”

Anthropologists for Justice and Peace was founded in 2009 with a mandate to work in solidarity with civil society, anti-war activist groups, and Indigenous communities, and “call[s] on anthropologists to radically rethink the nature of their position in local communities, to decolonize ethnography, and to re-conceive the nature of the research process so that ethics are not a minor, procedural consideration.”

The NCA and AAA both identify ethics as a major issue within HTS, citing an absence of any code of ethics for both researchers and the use of knowledge collected. The Human Terrain program attempts to approximate anthropological fieldwork methods where we develop intimate and constructive relationships with research subjects, Robert Albro told The Dominion, but does so operating in a state of ethical exception.

“Leadership [of HTS] has at different times and ways stated it doesn’t need to follow United States ethics,” said Albro.

The NCA has a similar position, writing that “the HTS program violates scientific and federal research standards mandating informed consent by research subjects.” Both are referring to the Common Rule, an ethical regulation which enshrines the protection of human subjects in scientific and medical research.

The AAA code of ethics promotes responsibility by anthropologists in the field, specifically toward the subjects of their research. At the heart of this code, Albro cites a “do no harm” ideology. This creates a problem if research is feeding military intelligence and facilitating the kill chain. Additionally, anthropological ethics state that research should be shared openly, especially with the fieldwork subjects. In the HTS, research immediately becomes classified, creating what Albro calls an issue with “social scientists working in secrecy.”

HTS adopts the language of anthropology and trains recruits in the basics of fieldwork,
yet only six PhD anthropologists, of over four hundred employees, are serving in the program. According to Zenia Helbidg—a former HTS recruit, who was fired for pointing out some of the program’s shortfalls to superior officers—HTS is “hiring anyone with a degree which they can sell as social sciences.”

There is concern that deploying the army approximation of anthropologists, clad in fatigues with a gun in hand, gives the image of bringing the full force of the military to bear in a fieldwork situation and fundamentally skews power dynamics between researchers and the communities they study.

“One [blowback] is to recast anthropologists as servants of empire, and as the eyes and ears of the national security state,” Canadian anthropologist Maximilian Forte told The Dominion. “Many anthropologists already, in the best of times, have been suspected of being intelligence agents. These developments will only solidify that perception, and could potentially put the lives of anthropologists abroad at risk.”

The most public example of this was on November 5, 2008, when Paula Loyd, a member of HTT AF4, was doused in a flammable liquid and set on fire while interviewing residents of the village of Chehel Gazi, 80 kilometers west of Kandahar city. She later died in a United States medical facility.

A United States military statement described the incident noting that one of Loyd's HTT co-workers shot and killed her assailant, sparking questions about why a United States civilian is carrying a weapon while deployed as part of an active military counterinsurgency operation. Lloyd’s team was embedded with Task Force 2-2, a United States unit deployed under the command and purview of the Canadian Forces Task Force Kandahar. The Canadian Forces made no public comment on the incident.

The situation in Canada is exasperated by the fact that any social scientist deployed with the Canadian military is a federal employee first, and an academic second.

“Their [WSATs'] job seems to be no different from that of HTS, except that for now the civilians they use are government employees, not academics,” Forte told The Dominion. “They have breached a barrier however: the idea that social and cultural knowledge can be useful for counterinsurgency, at least that door has now been opened in Canada”

Inquiries to the Canadian Forces were not returned by press time.

Academics, and their research, become part of the military intelligence machine in a system where, according the Canadian Forces COIN manual, “[R]egardless of what agencies are used to undertake activities, much of the assessment in support of operations will come from military intelligence staff.”

This places academia in a position which, according to Dr. Forte, mistakes “service to the state as service to the people—a mistake that is a hallmark of classic fascism.”

To date, the debate about military influence in anthropology and other social sciences remain chiefly in Unites States, but that could be changing. A well attended panel entitled “The Use of Culture and Anthropology in Counter-insurgency and Peacekeeping Operations” at the Canadian Anthropological Society’s 2009 conference, along with the foundation of groups like Anthropologists for Justice and Peace, are evidence of growing momentum against the military’s attempts to drape a green beret on the ivory tower.

Human intelligence programs represent a dangerous step towards “cultivating a dependency on the national security state, and on military funding, to build prestige, prominence and power,” according to Dr. Forte. “This will diminish the space of independent, critical intellectual endeavours, and ultimately create momentum against academia as a safe space in which to produce knowledge that challenges dominant assumptions.”

Cameron Fenton is an intern at The Dominion and an anthropology student at Concordia University in Montreal.

Embedded Anthropologists

Reading La Prensa in Honduras

dawn — Thu, 17 Dec 2009 16:50:16 +0000

Picture 4.png

Since I've been in Honduras, I've been hearing a constant refrain about the "medios golpistas," which is to say the pro-coup media. I avoided the papers for a while, preferring to listen to the radio, read online, and talk to Hondurans about the situation in the country (I generally do the same at home anyways).

That said, I caved and bought the paper today, and even though I was planning to spend the day transcribing, I feel compelled to write a post about flipping through La Prensa this morning over coffee.

"Government proposes break with ALBA" screams the headline on A1, with another story below on the assassination of the daughter of a pro-coup journalist.

The next three pages of the paper are dedicated to "The Keys of 2009," an ongoing series of unsigned opinion pieces presented as factual, objective reporting on the events that defined 2009.

Second of today's 12 "Keys" is a blurb titled "External aid pulled, commerce closed because of political crisis." I'm going to translate part of it here in an effort to get across the editorial perspective (again, masquerading as fact) in the paper.

The substitution of José Manuel Zelaya Rosales was like a bucket of icy water for the depressed national economy... The Internaional Monetary Fund - with who Zelaya had broken relations and had negated to sign a new memorandum of understanding with, was one of the first to distance itself from Honduras after June 28.

Not only is this a Non Sequitur, it's not true.

Honduran LGBTT activist and coup resistor Walter Tróchez killed

dawn — Thu, 17 Dec 2009 02:34:56 +0000

12.15.09.funeral_Walter_1.jpg

Prominant LGBTT activist Walter Tróchez was assassinated by gunmen in Tegucigalpa on Sunday, marking the 10th murder of a gay or trans activist since the June 28 military coup.

According to journalist Dina Meza, police did not visit the scene of the killing until more than 12 hours after Tróchez was killed. Meza wrote that his murder is "being managed with all the negligence possible by police investigators."

Tróchez was kidnapped and beaten on December 4, but managed to escape. According to sources close to Tróchez, police did not investigate the kidnapping.

From a letter Tróchez wrote less than a month before his death:

Anti-Mining Activist Mariano Abarca Assassinated in Chiapas

dawn — Sat, 28 Nov 2009 18:44:55 +0000

Picture 16.png

Mariano Abarca, a community activist known for his opposition to mining was assassinated last night in Chicomuselo, a town in Chiapas, Mexico.

Abarca was shot in the head and chest by a man on a motorcycle. He had been abducted in August, and again received death threats in the week prior to his death.

In a November 28 email to supporters, Gustavo Castro, an organizer with Otros Mundos AC in Chiapas, wrote:

[Mariano was] a dear friend, admired for his struggle against the Canadian mining company Blackfire, and a member of the Mexican Network of People Affected by Mining (REMA-Chiapas). Yesterday we spoke to him on the phone and he told us he had filed a complaint against the company. Today he's dead.

It is with great sadness that I write these words. I will continue to update here as more news becomes available.

Update: Here is the English translation of an article about the assassination from La Jornada.

Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal: New camouflage to better fight the enemy within?

dawn — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 19:41:32 +0000

Spec4ce-Urban-Day-135-90deg-95.jpg

Public Works and Government Services Canada has awarded a $25,000 contract to a BC firm in return for a controversial service -- the design of urban camouflage specifically suited to Toronto, Montréal and Vancouver.

The contract requirements are as follows:

The Department of National Defence, Defence Research and
Development Canada - Suffield, (DRDC-S), AB, has a requirement to develop a Canadian Urban Environment Pattern (CUEPAT) based on the unique requirements of Canada's three major metropolitan areas, Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal. The current CBR individual protective equipment (IPE) used by the Canadian military is provided in a woodland or desert camouflage. A camouflage suited to the Canadian urban environment is required when the milatary (sic) operates in urban terrain.

Hyperstealth Biotechnology Corp, pride of Maple Ridge, BC, was the only firm invited to bid on the contract. The company has designed camouflage patterns for countries including Israel, Iraq and Malaysia.

War in Yemen Means Business

dawn — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 06:14:59 +0000

While 30,000 IDPs remain inaccessible to relief, US Powered scores nuclear reactor

VANCOUVER—Yemen has been rocked by a series of violent clashes between government and rebel forces from the northern tribes since August, and plans to build a new nuclear reactor has sparked fears of increased tensions.

When the internal conflict in Yemen intensified in August from periodic clashes to full-scale military engagement, President Ali Abdullah Saleh was adamant that his forces would crush the rebel tribes.

"We are determined to destroy this sedition," he said in an address to military school graduates. "We will nip this cancer wherever it exists, in [the province of] Sa'ada or elsewhere."

The northern al-Houthi rebels immediately accused the armed forces of using weapons supplied by the US. A series of videos released by the Houthis displayed weapons they had confiscated from the army during skirmishes over the last year.

Yemen's government has since denounced the northern rebels for wanting to set up an independent Shia state in the country that mimics the pre-1962 theocracy.

In press releases, the government has also accused Iran of backing the Houthis with weapons and training.

On his website, the rebels' leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi has denied both accusations. He countered that his people have been fighting for their rights against a government that has become too cozy with Saudi Arabia, whose fundamentalist Wahhabi Sunni rulers see the 10 million Zaydi Yemeni Shi'ites as heretics. He also stressed the difference between Zaydi and Iranian Shi'ism.

Saudi Arabia has a noted interest in the conflict, and has been accused by Houthis of disallowing internally displaced people (IDPs) from entering its borders. Saudi interests in Yemen are like those of the US—primarily related to the threat of terrorism.

US and Pakistani officials are looking at the Arabian peninsula as the new breeding ground for terrorist activities, alleging a movement out of Afghanistan towards countries such as Somalia and Yemen.

Early in the year, deputy chief of Al Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri merged the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni wings of the group. This made enough waves for US President Barack Obama to send Yemen's President a letter in September asking for more cooperation in fighting Al Qaeda in the region.

During US Senator John McCain's August visit to Yemen, he mentioned that the US wholly supports efforts to enhance Yemen's security.

Yemen also gained attention in Canada as an alleged training ground for Canadian Islamic extremists.

"There's a great, and I think growing, fear among policy makers in Washington, in London, in Canada and in Europe about what instability in Yemen will mean for the future of a group like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula," Canadian Minister of Public Safety Peter Van Loan told the National Post on September 4.

Canadian firms were among those meeting with the Yemeni government in September over talks to build a nuclear reactor there. The deal eventually went to US-based Powered Corporation. Greenpeace was one of the first groups to note that the plant would likely increase instability in Middle East.

Energy shortfalls in Yemen are becoming worse, with rolling blackouts and water shortages affecting multiple provinces, particularly in the south of the country. Protests in that area are becoming increasingly violent, as more people become angry about marginalization by the federal government.

Reports regarding the war in the north are few and sporadic. By the end of September the Yemeni government was alleging that Operation Scorched Earth had killed hundreds of Houthi fighters and pushed the remainder out of their stronghold in Sa'ada.

In an October 14 address commemorating the Yemeni uprising against the British in 1963, President Saleh said that he expected to completely crush the rebels over the next few days.

The rebels have been reporting the opposite, claiming to have captured further cities and killed several government troops in Sa'ada province in September. Houthi sources said the rebels had even seized an army camp in early October.

Facts are hard to obtain since the Yemeni government has shut out news agencies from the area, forcing the latter to rely on government and rebel press releases. Both parties' claims have largely been unsubstantiated.

President Saleh mentioned in an Eid ul-Fitr address that Houthi rebels were using human shields and killing civilians. Resistance fighters countered that the army closed down a hospital because of its alleged links to Iran, and attacked a refugee camp.

Any potential for talks have been rebuffed by the government; further, Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi stated on September 15 that Yemen would reject all offers of external mediation.

One fact that has not been diluted is the humanitarian impact of the fighting. A combination of aerial bombardment by the government and head-to-head fighting have forced thousands to flee their homes.

Since August, 50,000 people have been uprooted to refugee camps or are stranded in the fighting, according to the Economist. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees notes that around 30,000 of these IDPs are inaccessible to relief workers. A total of about 150,000 people have been displaced since the first round of fighting between the government and rebels in 2004.

Coupled with the unrest in the south, the war in the north is quickly earning Yemen its spot as possibly the most increasingly troubled and poorest region in the Middle East.

Isaac K Oommen is a freelance journalist and commmunications coordinator from Dubai, now residing in Vancouver. Born a nomad, Isaac traveled extensively through the Middle East, south-east Asia and Pacific Asia before settling in Vancouver.

Yemen Business

Popular Resistance in Honduras tells the World: Support us in Self Defense

dawn — Sat, 07 Nov 2009 19:35:04 +0000

Picture 6.png

The US-backed deal meant to restore a "government of national unity" in Honduras is dead. How dead depends on your taste for dictators.

Totally Dead, if you ask ousted president Manuel Zelaya, who is still holed up in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa.

"No, it's not dead, but maybe sleeping for the time being," if you doubted the US State Department's position on the deal.

Popular organizations around Honduras, after expressing an initial support for the reinstatement of Zelaya, have since denounced the deal.

"Once again, history has shown us that the United States is not anyone's friend; we were once again betrayed when we endorsed an agreement full of gaps and capricious interpretations," Indigenous activist Salvador Zúñiga told IPS.

The Civil Council of Popular and Inidigenous Organizations of Honduras (COPINH) released a statement denouncing the coup and the negotiations on November 4.

In their statement, they "urge the National Front of Popular Resistance to raise an initiative of dialogue and negotiation towards more dignified agreements," call for a popular constituent assembly, and give the following message to international supporters:

Honduras: "After 125 Days of Struggle, Nobody Gives Up"

dawn — Sat, 31 Oct 2009 07:49:21 +0000

16362_1190203248175_1621175942_495623_1154761_n.jpg

The AP is reporting that Honduran legislators have the final say over a US backed deal that would see the restoration of Manuel Zelaya to power in Honduras.

However, Bloomberg reports that "opposition lawmakers could filibuster Zelaya’s return until after the elections, Antonio Rivera, the second highest ranking lawmaker for the National Party, said in an interview."

According to AP, which posted their most recent update at 0:00 PDT on October 31, the negotiations "drew praise from figures as diverse as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez." TeleSUR noted that while supportive, Chavez has not yet seen the agreement.

The negotiated solution comes as Zelaya and his supporters exhausted the last remaining poses for photographers in the Brazilian embassy. (Just kidding).

Seriously though, the negotiated solutions go along with what was laid out in the San José Accord back in July.

During a United Nations session in September, Zelaya expressed his disagreement with the San José Accord.

Chief Executive Officer, Afghanistan

dawn — Mon, 21 Sep 2009 05:16:37 +0000

Internationally sponsored elections reflect warlords’ power over Afghanistan

KABUL—Shahla Ata is a strong woman on shaky foundations.

“I think that Afghanistan needs a tough president. I don’t see that toughness and seriousness in the men but I see it in myself,” Doctor Ata said at her office in south Kabul before the August 20 ballot. “In America Obama brought a big change. I want to bring such a revolution.”

Ata, whose support lay mainly in urbanized Kabul, “knew she did not have any chance of winning” Afghanistan’s second presidential election, said Kabul based analyst Walliullah Rahmani. Her dream of bringing a revolution to Afghanistan was beset on all sides with problems, as was the election, which was marred by widespread fraud, low voter turnout and violence.

Many believe the democratic experiment, seen as a yardstick for international progress in the country, was oxymoronic given that most power still lies in the hands of warlords and military commanders. As the challenges of incorporating a democratic system into an archaic feudal society become increasingly obvious, plans are emerging for a chief executive position that could allow a civil administration more control.

Most of the presidential candidates were not taking part to win: out of 41, only three were serious contenders: incumbent Hamid Karzai, renowned World Bank economist Ashraf Ghani, and former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah.

“Apart from the main contenders, all the candidates have other motives. They are either trying to gain reputations or gain votes in constituencies that will help them bargain for concessions and positions of power later on,” said Sulaiman Aeyamat from Afghanistan’s Centre for Research and Policy Studies, during the run up to the election.

The large number of candidates reflects a country divided along tribal, ethnic, and religious lines. Many villages and communities voted in blocks under the direction of village elders, local power brokers, and religious leaders. The latter focused their support on those with the most clout. In a failing state such as Afghanistan, those who control arms and men direct the votes.

This is why Karzai recruited warlords such as Muhammed Fahim, who wields considerable influence over the Tajiks in Afghanistan. Fahim was going to run against Karzai but switched sides when he was offered the vice-presidential ticket. Aeyamat expected a number of the candidates to drop out and direct their supporters to vote for one of the main contenders, in return for political favors. Ten candidates stood down before the end of the election.

It looks as if Karzai benefited most from such deals. He also benefited from maintaining good relations with influential powerbrokers not involved in the political race, such as the infamous Uzbek warlord Abdul Dostum. Karzai’s main presidential rivals and international observers are currently lambasting him, alleging corruption. Thousands of votes are being recounted or thrown out.

Politician and women’s activist Massouda Jalal made an historic attempt to become Afghanistan’s first female president in 2005. She said the only good thing about the elections is the opportunity to show people how democracy is supposed to work.

“It is has been eight years [since the fall of the Taliban], and we don’t have rule of law in the country,” Jalal said at her home in Kabul in July. “The strong candidates belong to the previous commandership system. They will flush that system with money and they will be successful. It will all continue for another five years.”

Opinions differ as to whether a country looking for peace and development is helped by military figures, left over from Afghanistan’s myriad wars, dominating civil government.

“Military commanders are usually multi-talented. A military person can work as a police commander; he can be a teacher or a governor. I don’t see any problem with that. But a civilian person cannot be a military commander,” said former presidential candidate Abdul Salem Rocketi.

A former high-level Taliban commander turned M.P., Rocketi gained the moniker for his prowess with RPGs during the Soviet occupation. He was one of many candidates with a military background expected to gain from the election.

Gholam Guord Jailani, former president of the Afghan Olympic committee, doesn’t share Rocketi’s view. He said that since the appointment of General Mohammed Zaher Aghbar to head of the committee decisions have been made differently.

“Instead of someone with a sporting background, we have a person with a military background. He is making decisions independently and ideas are not being shared. The committee is losing its reputation,” said Jailani.

At the Tourism Ministry, a clerk, who did not wish to be named, was also critical of military figures owing their roles to patronage.

“During the wartime they had the guns, now they have the money. I spent five years at university, for what?” he said with tears in his eyes. “[My superior] comes in when he wants and does not do his job properly. I can do the job better than him, but I cannot argue because of his position.”

There is growing concern both in Afghanistan and abroad about the efficacy of an “elected” Kabul administration influenced by military commanders. This has led to increasing reports of a chief executive position being created within the government. The position would be similar to that of a corporate CEO.

The unelected seat would allow the US and Afghanistan to bypass the web of allegiances and power sharing that causes so many of the problems faced by the US and Afghan governments.

A draft report obtained by Kabul’s 8am paper in mid-June said the holder would have the power to “monitor the activities of ministers” involved with defense, foreign policy, counter terrorism, finance, and security. He would also have the power to propose “dismissing, or firing or changing of any official.”

In May, the New York Times reported that senior unnamed US and Afghan officials had revealed that previous US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, was in talks with Hamid Karzai about taking up the role. Both Khalilzad and the Karzai administration have denied discussing the controversial position, which would increase US control over the government in the long term.

Former World Bank executive Ashraf Ghani has been offered the position repeatedly. He has refused saying it was “not workable” in a democratic system, and decided instead to run against Karzai. The offer, however, is still being discussed between Karzai and Ghani, with the Americans’ encouragement.

For Massouda Jalal, the ethical implications of creating an independent political position, are outweighed by the potential to affect the pervasive alliances of the still strong military government.

“The chief executive position is a good idea”, she said. “There have been many military men given support in the government [since the fall of the Taliban], why not let someone else have a chance? We are in the primary stage of government building and it will allow experts to strengthen the leadership.”

Ryan Fletcher is a freelance journalist based in England. He recently traveled to Afghanistan.

Canada's Ambassador to Afghanistan

Election worker in Kandahar

Guatemalan Court Sets Precendent in the Case of Israel Carias

dawn — Wed, 09 Sep 2009 05:56:42 +0000

Community remembers a leader who gave his life for the struggle

ZACAPA, GUATEMALA—June 22, 2009, was an historic day for the family of Israel Carías Ortiz, and for the people of Guatemala. The Sentencing Tribunal in Zacapa, Guatemala found two men guilty of the 2007 murder of Ortiz and his two sons Ledwin Anilson (age 9) and Ronald Aroldo (age 11).

The precedent-setting sentence recognizes Carías was killed because of his leadership in the struggle to reassert legal rights to community land, and mandates an investigation into the planning or 'intellectual authorship' of the murder: the finqueros (large land-owners) presumably responsible for contracting the assassins to protect their interests.

In Guatemala, this sentence is referred to as 'dejar abierto,' meaning that though there was a verdict, the judges do not consider the crime resolved. However, due to many obstacles impeding justice in Guatemala, action to persecute intellectual authors remains extremely difficult.

The ruling has implications in establishing guilt for human rights crimes of the past, especially those committed during the 36-year internal armed conflict, over 99 per cent of which, according to the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala (ODHAG), remain in impunity. For the first time, a Guatemalan court established that guilt in attacks against human rights defenders goes beyond the actual perpetrators. Those responsible for orchestrating the attacks must be identified and held accountable for conceiving and financing the crime.

Carías, president of the regional peasant farmers’ association (ACUS) was shot at point-blank range while walking from his community, Los Achiotes, to the city of Zacapa with his sons in February 2007.

Backed by more than 80 families, Carías had led the campaign to recuperate community lands—legally recognized as such in 1951—from finqueros illegally usurping the territory.

In an audio-recording submitted as evidence during the trial, Carías described the campaign to residents of Los Achiotes: “We don’t want to touch lands that already have papers. We are fighting for national lands. I am only the spokesman for the needs of the community. I am not a judge; I do not decide. You have a right to the land according to the law.”

Yet after years of frustration in a stagnated legal and bureaucratic process, ACUS turned to negotiation in 2004 as a more effective way to secure the land. Though it meant ceding a portion of land to the finqueros, negotiation was seen as a necessary way of curbing further finquero encroachment and establishing firm boundaries.

The timing of Carías’ assassination coincided with a final land measurement, an approximate three-month deadline for the lands to be handed over to the community, and a nationwide increase in repression against those asserting their rights to land and natural resources.

According to witnesses and police reports prior to his murder, Carías had been intimidated and received death threats from the two accused, their families, and the finqueros, beginning in 2004. These actions had one goal: to force him to stop his campaign.

In spite of the dangers, Carías never stopped organizing.

A speech filmed before his death, which had been presented as evidence, reminded those in the packed courtroom of Carías’ steadfast commitment. “Despite the persecution, I will not allow a backward step,” declared Carías in the film footage.

The panel of judges affirmed that Carías was killed for defending his community’s rights.

After languishing in the public prosecutor’s office for two years, in March 2009 public hearings began. Over the course of four months, judges heard testimonies from more than 20 witnesses and reviewed upwards of 50 documents.

On June 22, 2009 the Tribunal delivered its verdict: the two accused, Jacobo Salguero and Manfredo Ramirez, respectively perpetrated and were accomplice to the premeditated assassination of Israel Carías at the instruction and in possible employment of the finqueros. Salguero was previously acquitted of a murder in 2004 because, as he described, "No one was willing to testify against him." Ramirez is his brother-in-law, as well as the nephew of Carías. Both men lived in Los Achiotes until their arrest.

It is assumed that the two children were killed for being with their father at the time. The sentence acknowledges the complexity and danger in communities that dare to defend land rights in the face of unlawful opposition.

Although there has not yet been any movement towards prosecuting the finqueros in this case, the sentence sends a clear message to those historically protected by nationwide impunity. This aspect of the sentence is perhaps more important for its symbolism than its possibility for prosecution in the case of Carías' murder.

Although the verdict sets key precedents, the sentence does little to change the day-to-day reality in the community—at least so far. Minutes after the sentencing, Carías’ widow commented on the verdict: “It’s a little.” For many members of the community of Los Achiotes, the sentence is exactly that: a little.

Today, the community is still waiting for the final document to arrive settling the land issue, and ACUS and the Association for Community Development of Los Achiotes (ACIDEA) leaders report feeling like targets for their organizing.

Currently, the president of ACIDEA is Carías’ twenty-one-year-old niece who knows intimately the responsibility and risk of the position. Inspired by her uncle, she refuses to be silenced by fear. “[My uncle] knew that sooner or later he would be killed for his organizing. But we all die. It is a question of dying on your knees or living standing up. We choose with our eyes open.”

Despite the risks, approximately a dozen members of the community and Carías’ family attended each of the hearings in solidarity—making the two-hour hike down the mountain to the hearings as a group. Many gave testimony themselves and received threats for doing so. One of Carías’ brothers likened the community to a flock of sheep that experienced the devastating effects of a coyote in their midst—now the community is “always alert, tense, vigilant. We learned,” he explained, shaking his head.

ACUS and ACIDEA have worked to reconstruct and honor the memory of Carías’ life that had been overshadowed by his murder and the trial in the weeks since the verdict.

ACUS organized a march to the Tribunal as a tribute to Carías’ organizing, to demonstrate appreciation for justice served, and to petition the court to proceed with other pending ACUS cases. At a community lunch, people remembered Carías, their memories building upon each other as they recalled his dedication to the community:

“He was kind to everyone.”

“Even as a boy, he knew he would lead his community.”

“He was a man of vision.”

“He was a great leader. He literally gave his life for the community.”

ACIDEA hopes to construct a memorial in Los Achiotes to ensure that Carías—and his sacrifice for the common good—is not forgotten.

Amanda Kistler has been an international human rights observer with the Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA) since January 2008. She currently lives in Guatemala City.

For more about impunity in Guatemala and prosecuting forced disappearance cases, read Valerie Croft's Disappeared Before the Courts.

In memory of Israel Carías

Looking down at the city of Zacapa

IMF bails out Honduras Coup Regime with $150 million

dawn — Wed, 02 Sep 2009 16:39:21 +0000

3813318304_3ce4848a11_b.jpg

Reuters' Spanish service and Venezeuala's Telesur are reporting that the IMF granted US$150 million to the defacto regime in Honduras, which is now into into its third month.

Both reports stem from a press release by the Honduran Central Bank (BCH).

The BCH release reads (in part):

"At the initiative of the twenty industrialized and emerging countries (G-20), presided by the Prime Minister of England, Gordon Brown, the International Monetary Fund injects liquidity into the world economy and Honduras augments it's international reserves by $150.1 million."

The CBH release goes on to state that the money was received on August 28th. Telesur is reporting that the IMF will give another $13.8 million to the coup regime next week.

The IMF does not have an update on their Honduras page since before the coup happened. The BCH has not posted a press release in English since last year.

The only report on the payment in English thus far is posted on Iran's PressTV.

Photo of anti-coup protesters in Honduras by Sandra Cuffe. All translations above are unofficial.

Butcher and Bolt

dawn — Fri, 21 Aug 2009 05:45:30 +0000

Why "special forces" fail in Afghanistan, from Churchill to Obama

VANCOUVER—With the ongoing enlargement of US forces in Afghanistan—expected to include a 29 per cent increase in special forces—observers reasonably expect a corresponding rise in violence in that country. But if history is any guide, the augmented firepower may also bring more of a particular brand of counterinsurgency.

As early as 2007, reports emerged of a vicious special forces attack on civilians in Helmand province. Villagers from Toube, in a remote area near the Pakistan border, claimed that foreign special forces along with Afghan soldiers entered the village in a helicopter late at night and proceeded to enter homes and kill civilians on the spot.

Locals interviewed by Afghan journalists "spoke consistently of soldiers breaking down doors, shooting children and cutting throats," and claimed as many as 18 civilians were killed. The accusations were ignored by the international press.

In Winston Churchill's day, such tactics were known as "butcher and bolt" operations and involved indiscriminate attacks on Pashtun villages, leaving crops and homes burned. Circa 1897, the young Churchill's unit, stationed on the edge of British India, were practitioners of the art. Later in his career, Churchill would recommend their use, by name, against the coastal towns of occupied Europe.

But savagery against the Afghan enemy was a feature of British policy from day one, going back to the First Anglo-Afghan War, whose failures would be repeated twice more at 40-year intervals.

The First Anglo-Afghan War ended in 1842 with a storm of English revenge for an infamous incident where the British garrison forces at Kabul were massacred as they retreated. The "Army of Retribution," led by General Nott, was duly dispatched from British India for the purpose of "re-establishing our reputation," in the words of the Governor General. With their reputation at stake the British forces set to work, and several months of savagery reached its climax in an attack on a village north of Kabul where British-led forces killed every adult male and raped and killed many women.

The Second Anglo-Afghan War saw General Roberts' still-remembered "reign of terror" in Kabul. In 1880, as the war was winding down, Pashtun forces met the British in Helmand in the Battle of Maiwand, wiping them out. The retreating Brits then occupied the city of Kandahar, ousting its 8000 civilian inhabitants while they prepared retribution.

Despite history's lessons, and in the face of Afghan opposition, US president Barack Obama is going to ramp up the war. "Most of the Afghans interviewed," writes veteran correspondent Pamela Constable, "said they would prefer a negotiated settlement with the insurgents to an intensified military campaign."

Skeptical responses to the surge don't end with its civilian recipients. Even some American officers and military theorists who championed the surge doctrine's use in Iraq are "divided" over its applicability in Afghanistan, according to counterinsurgency specialist Andrew Exum.

Neither is it the case that troop surges have not yet been tried in the current conflict. The results have been consistent—namely, an increase in insurgent violence commensurate with the build-up of foreign troops in the country. Civilian casualties have inevitably followed the surge in violence, hence the opposition of the Afghan population to another troop surge. There is little reason to expect a different result this time around.

This apparent disconnect between tactics and expected results has spread, along with the war, into Pakistan. A recent New York Times report cites "CIA veterans" in Pakistan who warn that Predator strikes "won't undermine, and may promote, the psychology of anti-American militancy" which is already on the rise.

While civilian casualties are widely considered the most important determinant of success for the counterinsurgency effort, there too the US-led war machine is out of touch. While we are regretful when we kill civilians, goes the Pentagon line, we must remember that we do so by accident. The Taliban, on the other hand, do so on purpose, revealing the depths of evil in which they lurk.

Yet Pashtun civilians see it decidedly differently. In their view, violence against civilians is mainly the fault of the US/NATO occupation. As a correspondent with substantial recent experience in the country explains, "[I]t does not matter if the victim was killed by the Taliban, US forces or Nato soldiers. Relatives of the dead now usually blame the government and the occupation for their loss."

Nor does the highest law of the land support the Pentagon stance. International law makes no distinction between deliberate attacks on civilians, which western military leaders often accuse the Taliban of committing, and indiscriminate attacks. "From the standpoint of the law of international armed conflict," notes a leading legal scholar, "there is no genuine difference between a premeditated attack against civilians (or civilian objects) and a reckless disregard of the principle of distinction; they are equally forbidden."

None of this vital context gets coverage or commentary in the mass media, which prefers stories about helpful occupation soldiers whose victory is imminent. Amnesty International's recent assessment of the war in Afghanistan might therefore shock any North American news editor: "Violations of international humanitarian and human rights law were committed with impunity by all parties, including Afghan and international security forces and insurgent groups. All sides carried out indiscriminate attacks, which included aerial bombardments" by NATO and US-led forces.

In spite of impending violence and disaster, the Obama administration and its international partners will persevere in bringing more misery to a terrorized land. As the staid publication The Economist predicted last year: "If America fails in Afghanistan, as it might, it will be remembered there for killing children."

Dave Markland lives in Vancouver where he organizes with StopWar.ca and edits a blog at stopwarblog.blogspot.com.

Helmand Afghanistan Sand

Helmand Afghanistan Mountains

The Future of Warfare

dawn — Sat, 11 Jul 2009 15:01:53 +0000

Canadian counterinsurgency manual reflects US-Canada "synergy"

Capping a sweeping transformation that began in the late 1990s, the Canadian Forces recently issued their first counterinsurgency (COIN) operations doctrine, which will help Canadian soldiers prepare to fight the wars of today and the "foreseeable future," alongside its chief ally and the sole global superpower, the US.

In development since 2005, the COIN manual was authorized by Chief of Land Staff Lt. Gen. Andrew Leslie in the waning days of the Bush administration. It was not formalized for another two months—six weeks after the inauguration of President Barack Obama.

Obama's administration has sent clear signals, through political appointments and holdovers (such as Defense Secretary Robert Gates), that the US military and national security apparatus' transformation toward fighting smaller, "irregular wars" begun under Bush will continue apace.

Only a week before Bush left office, Gates, together with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Director of USAID, Henrietta Fore, co-signed the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide. Neo-conservative historian Eliot Cohen, who oversaw the Guide's creation, wrote in its introduction:

Insurgency will be a large and growing element of the security challenges faced by the United States in the 21st century...Whether the United States should engage in any particular counterinsurgency is a matter of political choice, but that it will engage in such conflicts during the decades to come is a near certainty. This Guide will help prepare decision-makers of many kinds for the tasks that result from this fact.

According to Lt. Gen. Leslie, the Canadian Army is "at the cutting edge" of Western armies readying themselves to fight 21st-century wars.

"The paradigms of the past based on the Cold War have changed a great deal. We have demonstrated beyond any doubt that we can adapt our doctrine and training quickly in order to meet scattered, complex operations focused on counterinsurgency missions," Leslie told a Senate defence committee meeting in March.

Shifts in Canadian policy adhere closely to those of her allies, like the US, the UK and other NATO partners. These governments are at the forefront of institutionalizing COIN principles and practices in military culture, across the "whole-of-government," and, eventually, within the "whole of society."

Based on the "comprehensive approach," the Canadian COIN manual represents a synthesis of two recent US Army Field Manuals: Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24); and Stability Operations (FM 3-07).

In 2007, after over one-and-a-half million downloads, the US Army COIN manual was published in print by the University of Chicago Press and received wide media coverage. The subsequent US Army Stability Operations Manual, published in early 2009, has also been widely distributed. By contrast, the Canadian manual is not yet publicly available. A copy of the Canadian COIN manual was obtained by The Dominion from the Department of National Defence.

Writing in the Canadian Military Journal last fall, Leslie defined the comprehensive approach as the "ability to bring to bear all instruments of national and coalition power and influence upon a problem in a timely, co-ordinated fashion." This definition aligns with that of the US Army, as found in the Stability Operations Manual:

A comprehensive approach...integrates the co-operative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

The concept of "unity of effort" is drawn from classical counterinsurgency theory and doctrine.

In 1966, John J. McCuen wrote in The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War that, "Unity of effort...is extremely difficult to achieve because it represents the fusion of civil and military functions to fight battles which have primarily political objectives."

As the Canadian manual foregrounds, today's insurgencies remain inherently "a political problem."

"The nature of operations today and in the future will resemble the Three Block War construct—one that demands that soldiers interact with many different players other than their own armed forces, and undertake non-traditional tasks," wrote Leslie in the Canadian Military Journal.

In October 2003, [then Chief of the Land Staff and Lt. Gen. Rick] Hillier made the Three Block War scenario "a guiding concept for the Canadian Army."

Hillier's support for the Three Block War was one of the reasons he was selected to be Chief of Defence Staff in 2005. According to then-Prime Minister Paul Martin, "[Hillier] advocated a concept called the 'three-block war,' to describe the [military's] mission...This was not a rejection of our peacekeeping tradition, but a revision to suit tougher times, and I supported it."

Martin's government dovetailed the Three Block War approach with the broader institutionalization of the "whole-of-government" (or 3D: Defence, Development, Diplomacy) foreign policy approach in its International Policy Statement of 2005. This trajectory has continued, with minor modifications, under the minority Conservative governments of Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

That Canada should shift its foreign and defence policies in concert with the US comes as no surprise given their close historical relationship, even if the level of integration is often downplayed by the mainstream media. "No two militaries are more closely united than those of the United States and Canada," said US Ambassador to Canada David Wilkins in 2007.

With counterinsurgency practices and principles on the rise under the Obama administration, an increasing level of "COIN-synergy" exists between the two militaries.

"We are learning from others. I happen to know General David Petraeus, who is very good man. You will find that some of our recent philosophies closely match his and those of the US Army and our friends and allies," Lt. Gen. Leslie told the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence in March.

Gen. Petraeus is likely the person who contributed the most to the resurrection of a new "counterinsurgency era" in the US. He oversaw the drafting of the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual in 2005 and 2006, and supervised its implementation during "the surge" in Iraq in 2007.

As Commander of US Central Command, Petraeus currently oversees both the Iraq and "AfPak" wars. Many followers of Petraeus have risen to prominence within Obama's cabinet; others have gone on to become "experts" in private think-tanks and appear regularly in the US media as proponents of counterinsurgency war.

Petraeus visited Calgary this week for a "social" meeting with Canada's top military brass. Partly a public relations exercise, the meeting saw Petraeus and Canadian Chief of Defence Staff Walt Natynczyk, who once served in Iraq at the same time as the US general, donning cowboy hats as they attended the Calgary Stampede. There, according to Petraeus, they discussed "the way forward for the next two years" in the COIN fight in Afghanistan.

Petraeus was subordinate in rank to Natynczyk when the Canadian general was Deputy Commander of the Multi-National Corps in Iraq in 2003-04. At the same time, Petraeus commanded a small number of Canadian soldiers in Iraq on a low-key NATO mission to train Iraqi soldiers, according to declassified documents obtained by The Dominion via Access to Information.

The clearest embodiment of COIN's institutionalization and the Canada-US "comprehensive approach" can be found in the US Army and Marine Corps COIN Center. Established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 2006 by Petraeus and US Marine General James Mattis, it was from the COIN Center that the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) was drafted.

The COIN Center's pamphlet describes its purpose as "facilitat[ing] the development of a culture that enables us to more effectively adapt as a whole government when called upon to deal with future COIN or COIN-like threats."

Canada is identified in the pamphlet as a key COIN-partner of the US in the "COIN SITREP reports" that Lt. Col. Daniel Roper, Director of the COIN Center, publishes periodically.

"Each country needs to institutionalize it in a way that works for them," Roper told The Dominion. "But I see some pretty impressive collaboration at the inter-agency level in Canada, with people of cross-functional expertise trying to grapple with some issues; some similar things that we're doing."

Since General Leslie signed off on the COIN manual last December, the COIN Center and Canada have collaborated on more than 20 exchanges, including "COIN Leader Workshops" and "COIN Integration" meetings.

Members of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) met with the COIN Center for discussions about "US-Canada COIN synergy" five days after Leslie wrote in his issuing order for the new COIN doctrine that it is "complementary to our allies."

In April, the US COIN Center "visited military installations and think-tanks in Canada to inculcate the Canadian military establishment with COIN doctrine and best practices."

During one presentation with top officials from Prime Minister Harper's government, the COIN Center found that "policy advisors were most interested in how the merits of [Canada's new Afghan COIN] strategy could be explained to the Canadian public and Canadian political leadership."

Figuring out ways to sell the COIN campaign to a skeptical Canadian public has been a key aim of the Canadian government and military, and Canada's COIN manual emphasizes the goal of "creating and maintaining the legitimacy of the campaign." One of the central figures steering the Canada-US COIN-synergy is Lt. Col. John Malevich, who joined the COIN Center in November 2008 by way of a newly created exchange program between the two countries. He is currently the Deputy-Director of the COIN Center and recently gave a series of COIN lectures in Canada.

Reached via telephone upon his return to Ft. Leavenworth, Malevich told The Dominion that the biggest assets that he brings to the COIN Center are his scholarly background in asymmetric warfare and first-hand COIN experience in Afghanistan.

Prior to joining the COIN Center, Malevich was a member of the Strategic Advisory Team—a team of military advisors set up by General Hillier to provide direct advice to top Afghan cabinet ministers. He was later seconded to the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission, where Malevich says he "came up with their operations plan and their security plan" for the presidential elections scheduled for August 2009.

"When I speak, these guys give me a pretty good respect and they're pretty grateful to have this help...they're very grateful to have Canadians among them and grateful for the contribution we've made in Afghanistan," said Lt. Col. Malevich of his colleagues at the COIN Center.

Col. Roper, who says he's been to Canada "four or five times" to discuss COIN, told The Dominion that by having Malevich "institutionally embedded" in the COIN Center, "The Canadian Army benefits from having a full-time person working in here with full access to everything we've got and recognizing [when] he stumbles upon something here that, hey, he knows somebody in the Canadian Army that might benefit from that; he can very quickly share that information."

Invoking Gen. Charles Krulak, the US marine who coined the term "Three Block War" and who, in 1997, predicted the importance of "transnational movements" to 21st-century warfare, Roper said that today, "what we're looking at are transnational insurgencies."

Partnering as closely as possible with key allies like Canada is seen as crucial to conducting what some COIN experts call "global counterinsurgency."

According to Malevich, one of his key roles is "bringing [US COIN] expertise up to Canada and bringing it into the Canadian military culture."

Such a level of COIN integration has never been undertaken before, and it is difficult to foresee the possible implications for Canada's military culture, which inevitably spills over into broader society.

"The better the people understand the pros and cons and the risks [of COIN], the more informed a decision they can make," says Roper.

In her introduction to the University of Michigan Press edition of the US Army Stability Operations Manual, Janine Davidson acknowledges that, “[There] are those who see the new doctrine as another dangerous step on the slippery slope toward imperialism.”

Davidson dismisses those critics, writing that they "seriously misunderstand the purpose and role of military doctrine"—because the military doesn't set the policies that send them to occupy other countries.

On the other hand, influential COIN advocates such as Eliot Cohen have argued that the US needs to establish an "Imperial Army," the likes of which Canada is increasingly becoming appended to.

Anthony Fenton is an independent researcher and journalist based in Pitt Meadows, B.C. This article is based on a book he has been researching and writing with Jon Elmer. Fenton can be reached at fentona@shaw.ca

Tim Horton's opening Ceremony, Kandahar, 2006

The ongoing outsourcing in Afghanistan

Amy Miller — Fri, 29 May 2009 13:54:23 +0000

outsourcing.jpg

The ongoing outsourcing in Afghanistan

Canada’s Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar, Afghanistan will not be put in harms way, despite the oft-repeated political promise that all of Canada’s ground troops will be withdrawn by 2011. The responsibility of the security of these specialists-contractors themselves- will instead be provided by private companies, who will need to go through a selection process, according to Canada’s Ambassador to Afghanistan Ron Hoffmann who spoke to journalists via video-conference, earlier this week.

This is not the first time that the Canadian government has decided to hire private security companies in Afghanistan. The British based firm, Saladin Security , has been protecting the Canadian Embassy in Kabul for many years, while many Afghan contractors including warlords, have been hired to protects convoys of Canadian personnel or provide a "security cordon" for high risk situations, such as roadside bombs going off.